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Subjective wellbeing:  
a primer for poverty analysts
Sridhar Venkatapuram
The article reviews the current theory and measurement of subjective wellbeing (SWB). The 
first two sections discuss growing efforts in many countries to measure and monitor national 
wellbeing, particularly in the United Kingdom. The third and fourth sections discuss the novelty and 
controversies about SWB research. It concludes that a critical approach is essential in evaluating 
SWB research but dismissing it offhand or framing it as antithetical to objective wellbeing is 
misconceived. The pressing issue for poverty research and public policy is to determine which 
insights about SWB are worth using, and how much space within conceptions of wellbeing used in 
public policy should be given to SWB.
Introduction
Encapsulating his philosophy of capabilities freedom in relation to poverty, Amartya 
Sen writes, ‘Poverty is about the inability to lead a decent – minimally acceptable 
– life, and while low income does make it difficult to lead a life of freedom and 
wellbeing, an exclusive concentration on seeing poverty as lowness of income misses 
out a great many important connections’ (Sen, 2007). What is worth noting as a 
prelude to the discussion below on subjective wellbeing is that at the same time 
as advocating the expansion of the definition and analysis of poverty beyond just 
lowness of income to a broader framework of freedoms and wellbeing, advocates 
of the new ‘capability’ paradigm have expressed ambivalence if not vehement 
resistance to including subjective testimony about wellbeing within this broader 
conception. This resistance is informed by a variety of sources including the Marxist 
concept of false consciousness, the work of Jon Elster (1983)and others on adaptive 
preference formation, the worried well/inverse care law phenomena, as well as 
deep epistemological problems to do with inter-personal comparisons of subjective 
experience and testimony. 
Much of the new paradigm of poverty analysis promulgates a conception 
of ‘objective wellbeing’ – wellbeing of a person, social group, or country that is 
conceived and evaluated from a non-subjective, external view as if done by an 
impartial spectator. Developing such an impartial view of wellbeing is said to require 
inter-disciplinary and philosophical reasoning, contextual analysis as well as open 
and rigorous public deliberation (Sen, 2009). Examples of such exercises include the 
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United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index and Martha 
Nussbaum’s identification of ten central human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2006: 76–8). 
The rapidly growing body of research and policy literature on subjective wellbeing, 
thus directly challenges both the resistance to subjective testimony as well as the 
objective conceptions of wellbeing in the new poverty paradigm. The implications 
of the explosion of interest and research on subjective wellbeing go much beyond 
poverty analysis, but it is beyond the scope of this discussion to do more than make 
cursory references to some of those implications.
The following discussion reviews the current theory and measurement of 
subjective wellbeing (SWB) also referred to as happiness, mental wellbeing, positive 
psychology, and so forth. So many different terms are being used because many 
disciplines and policy agendas are involved, ranging from psychology, economics and 
epidemiology to the social statistics, social inclusion and environmental sustainability 
movements. Before discussing subjective wellbeing, I briefly describe in section 1 
the increasing efforts in many countries to measure and monitor national wellbeing. 
The second section discusses the measurement of national wellbeing in the United 
Kingdom. These two sections are presented because the UK is seen as taking a lead in 
developing national wellbeing measures by, among other things, incorporating ‘state 
of the art’ subjective wellbeing measures. The third section then focuses on subjective 
wellbeing research. The fourth section presents a more critical discussion on SWB. 
Indeed, the present discussion could have focused just on SWB – its history and 
theory, recent research advances, current questions, and so forth. There are already, 
however, a number of good reviews (Diener et al, 1999; Dolan et al, 2008; Ryan and 
Deci, 2001; United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2008; Huppert et al, 
2005; Stoll et al, 2012). I would argue that the insights, limitations and controversies 
about subjective wellbeing come into clearer relief in the context of real-world 
public policy applications much more than in reviews of the most prominent 
research projects and academic literature. The development of national wellbeing 
measures is one such site of practical application, and a very important one at that, 
and the collection of subjective wellbeing data in the UK is supposed to reflect the 
most current knowledge in the area.
In the conclusion, I take the position that a critical approach is essential in 
evaluating subjective wellbeing research and its application in public policies. 
Dismissing it offhand or framing subjective wellbeing as being wholly antithetical 
to objective wellbeing is, however, misconceived. Any impartial spectator would 
reason that the wellbeing of a human being should include various positive mental 
states such as joy, pleasure and, indeed, some preference satisfaction and happiness. 
For example, Nussbaum includes joy and pleasure in her list (Nussbaum, 2006: 76–
8). Conversely, the impartial spectator would also have good reason to argue that 
valuing only positive feelings or preference satisfaction would miss out on some 
very important goods of life. The more coherent and pressing issue for public policy, 
including poverty analysis, is to determine which insights are worth using and how 
to integrate them – how much space within conceptions of wellbeing for use in 
public policy should be given to subjective wellbeing. 
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a 
to
: L
on
do
n 
Sc
ho
ol
 o
f H
yg
ie
ne
 &
 T
ro
pi
ca
l M
ed
ici
ne
IP
 : 
19
4.
80
.2
29
.2
44
 O
n:
 F
ri,
 1
0 
Ja
n 
20
14
 1
7:
54
:1
6
Co
py
rig
ht
  T
he
 P
ol
icy
 P
re
ss
7Sridhar Venkatapuram
Journal of Poverty and Social Justice • vol 21 • no 1 • 2013 • 5-17 • http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/175982713X664029
1 National wellbeing measures
Governments and other institutions worldwide are increasingly interested in 
measuring and monitoring wellbeing at the individual, social group and national 
levels. Such measurement and monitoring is meant to inform policymaking in 
a variety of domains. Furthermore, at least in Europe, there are efforts to create 
some uniformity in national wellbeing measurement instruments in order to make 
cross-country comparisons possible. There are also a growing number of global 
measurement instruments for measuring and monitoring wellbeing across countries 
(Parliament Office of Science and Technology, 2012). 
What is wellbeing?
In the literature relevant to the present discussion, definitions of wellbeing vary and 
many terms are used including national wellbeing, individual wellbeing, subjective 
wellbeing, happiness, quality of life, and positive psychology. Some view wellbeing as 
wholly psychological; it is subjectively experienced by individuals. Such psychological 
experience can refer to positive moods or emotions such as happiness. It can also be 
an evaluative judgement about one’s satisfaction with life overall or within certain 
domains of life. A contrasting view is that wellbeing refers to a largely external 
assessment of a person’s daily living conditions such as her abilities and opportunities 
to live a good life in a particular community or country. Yet another prominent 
view is that wellbeing results from or reflects meaningful and sustainable interactions 
between an individual and their social and physical environment.
Wellbeing research
Researchers from different disciplines including economics, psychology, public health, 
neurobiology, and sociology are examining the causes, components, consequences 
and distribution of both subjective and objective wellbeing. In the first instance, the 
aim is to identify personal characteristics, behaviours, life experiences and external 
conditions that are correlated with aspects of wellbeing such as higher longevity, 
better health, more life satisfaction and happiness. Beyond simple descriptions, 
however, there is clearly a concern about causation. For example, Amartya Sen argues 
that life expectancy is the ‘absolutist core’ of wellbeing, and that it is a function 
of well-functioning economic and political institutions (Sen, 1995; Sen, 1999; 
Venkatapuram, 2011). Edward Deci and Richard Ryan argue that living a life with 
self-direction, meaningful relationships, engagement and skill development leads to 
greater wellbeing (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
A novel aspect of wellbeing research coming out of psychology in recent decades 
is that it focuses on the components and causes of positive aspects of human lives. 
This is in contrast to the traditional focus in health sciences on the negatives such 
as illness and impairments. The starting premise is that the absence of mental and 
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physical impairments does not necessarily lead to positive wellbeing; it is understood 
as having its own distinct causes, constitutive components, dynamics, and so forth.
Motivations for national measures
Against this background of wellbeing research, five key factors have motivated several 
countries to develop national wellbeing measures. First, there is now political interest 
in developing new indicators to assess how well or poorly the lives of citizens are going 
that are more informative than macro-economic indicators such as GDP. Second, 
there have been advances in measurement techniques to capture more efficiently 
people’s daily experiences of emotions. Third, researchers are identifying different 
dimensions or kinds of subjective wellbeing, and their links to health, mortality, 
productivity, cost-savings and environmental sustainability. Fourth, economists and 
policy makers see potential for using subjective wellbeing data in policy design, 
monitoring and evaluation of programmes, and to target scarce resources more 
efficiently. Fifth, there is excitement about the potential for behavioural economics 
research – the psychology of decision making under uncertainty – to inform the 
design of wellbeing public policy. 
Limitations of economic indicators
Part of the political interest in developing national wellbeing measures, such as in 
the Sarkozy initiated Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress (CMEPSP) in France, is to find supplementary measures to the 
standard economic measures of national progress (Stiglitz et al, 2009). During periods 
of affluence and economic growth, the rosy economic figures such as rising GDP 
have been recognised as not capturing all that there is to economic performance, 
social progress and social equity (the CMEPSP was established in early 2008 prior to 
the start of the global economic crisis.) Because the CMEPSP report, its background 
papers, and many others have thoroughly reviewed the problems with the prevalent 
use of GDP and national accounts as indicators of national wellbeing, I move onto 
what the CMEPSP suggested as a template for national wellbeing measures. 
The CMEPSP’s influential report recommended that national wellbeing 
measures should include eight core components: material living standards (income, 
consumption and wealth); health; education; personal activities (including work); 
political voice and governance; social connections and relationships; environment 
(present and future conditions); and insecurity, (economic and physical) (Stiglitz et al, 
2009: 14). In large part due to recommendations of the Commission, many countries 
with established social statistics agencies are developing a set of key indicators or a 
‘dashboard’ of national wellbeing. 
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Measuring national wellbeing in the UK 
In November 2010, in response to a request by the government, the UK’s Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) began developing indicators of national wellbeing. 
These were developed based on guidance from international and national expert 
and stakeholder panels as well as wide public consultations. The UK is seen as taking 
a global lead in developing national wellbeing measures because of the process it is 
using, and for being at the forefront of incorporating subjective wellbeing measures. 
While the CMEPSP used the metaphor of a car dashboard, the heuristic model the 
ONS presents suggests subjective wellbeing as the central focus or outcome with 
proximate and distal influencing factors. The proximate factors include ‘relationships, 
health, what we do, where we live, personal finance and education and skills’. The 
distal factors include ‘governance, the economy, and the natural environment’ (United 
Kingdom Office of National Statistics, 2012: 23).
Subjective wellbeing questions in UK
Alongside identifying the indicators for and collecting information on the proximate 
and distal influencing factors, the ONS began asking four questions on subjective 
wellbeing as part of the annual Integrated Household Survey (IHS) and the Opinions 
and Lifestyle Survey. The IHS sample population is made up of 165,000 adults aged 
16 and over (United Kingdom Office of National Statistics, 2012). For each of the 
four questions, respondents rated their answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘not 
at all’ and 10 is ‘completely’. The four questions were:
1 Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?
2 Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile?
3 Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
4 Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?
The first annual report was released in July 2012. Three-quarters of people rated 
their life satisfaction as 7 or more out of 10 and 80 per cent gave a rating of at least 
7 when asked if they felt that their lives were worthwhile. At the same time 40 per 
cent of the respondents scored high on the anxiety scale. Teenagers, those aged over 
65 and those with partners reported higher life satisfaction and worthwhile ratings. 
Almost half of those unemployed rated their life satisfaction as below 7, as did two-
fifths of those with a disability. 
Subjective wellbeing
The novelty of the UK ONS’s development of national wellbeing measures lies 
not just in the capturing of subjective wellbeing information. It is also that they 
are capturing information on four currently recognised dimensions of subjective 
wellbeing, all in one place. Subjective wellbeing is often referred to as happiness, but 
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it is only one component or dimension. Subjective wellbeing is often divided into 
two distinct areas – ’hedonic’ and ‘eudemonic’ wellbeing (Ryan and Deci, 2001). 
Hedonic wellbeing encompasses moods or emotions, termed affect, and includes 
happiness, pleasure and joy. Psychologists are now also exploring a broad range of 
‘feeling good’ emotions such as interest, engagement, optimism and confidence. 
There is also now a distinction made between positive affect and positive evaluation 
of how one’s life overall is going (global evaluation) or within certain domains. 
Moreover, along with it becoming more established that experiences of positive and 
negative emotions work independently there is attention being given to measuring 
the daily presence of negative emotional experiences such as anxiety, pain, tiredness 
and anger. 
Thus, hedonic wellbeing, which initially focused on happiness, is now separated 
into three dimensions including positive affect, unpleasant affect, and life satisfaction. 
What is interesting about this fast developing area of research, with its appealing focus 
on human happiness, is that prominent researchers are reticent about developing a 
comprehensive theory on subjective wellbeing. Recently, there have been efforts 
by some advocates to link it to theory, most prominently to Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism (Layard, 2011). However, for most researchers the primary focus is on 
collecting more ‘elementary facts’ about each of these dimensions.
Eudemonic wellbeing, in contrast to hedonic wellbeing, is a term that directly draws 
on Aristotle’s philosophy of a flourishing life. Advocates of eudemonic wellbeing 
conceive of a flourishing human life or wellbeing as something broader than one 
made up of pleasurable experiences or fulfilling desires. This is because individuals 
who have certain subjectively felt needs may impair their own development and 
growth through satisfying those needs, even when they are pleasure producing (for 
example, drug use). Nevertheless, there are a variety of theories and conceptions of 
what eudemonia, a good life, good development, or healthy living is for individuals. 
Many of these theories draw on both philosophy and psychology, and have much in 
common with proponents of objective wellbeing. 
There is much contentious debate between the advocates of hedonic and 
eudemonic wellbeing largely around whether happiness or positive affect is the 
totality of subjective wellbeing or wellbeing. Whether the views of experts on what 
constitutes a good life or eudemonia should supersede a person’s own determination 
of whether they are experiencing wellbeing, and what causes and constitutes their 
wellbeing, is also controversial. Proponents of hedonic wellbeing believe that 
eudemonic wellbeing advocates are unjustifiably paternalistic. 
The four questions the ONS is using, and the order in which they are asked, are 
meant to reflect the state of the art of the field of subjective wellbeing research. The 
questions were developed by Paul Dolan, Richard Layard and Robert Metcalfe (Dolan 
et al, 2011). Indeed, the four questions are intended to reflect both the hedonic and 
eudemonic conceptions of wellbeing. In the ONS documents, subjective wellbeing 
is divided into three categories: evaluative (question 1), experience (questions 3 and 
4), and eudemonic (question 2). The experience or affect category has two questions, 
one for positive and the other for negative emotional experiences. As stated earlier, 
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eudemonic wellbeing has much in common with objective wellbeing in that its 
conceptualisation and measurement is done through an external perspective. Some 
proponents of eudemonic wellbeing would resist it being classified as subjective 
wellbeing at all. Dolan and colleagues take the position that eudemonic wellbeing 
becomes subjective wellbeing when it becomes operational (Dolan et al, 2011: 
9). That is, we are to understand that the best way to gather data on eudemonic 
wellbeing requires asking people for self-reports on ‘how much meaning our lives 
have’ and thus, it becomes akin to the other evaluative responses to subjective 
wellbeing. However, they put quotation marks around ‘eudemonic’ to identify 
blurred boundaries between subjective and objective wellbeing. 
Why subjective wellbeing
As stated above, there are a number of factors that are driving policy and public 
interest in wellbeing and subjective wellbeing. We may rightly ask if the driving 
factors are justified or well-reasoned. Many of the prominent early researchers 
of subjective wellbeing do seem to take the view that happiness is a fundamental 
value and thus are motivated to push forward the boundaries of knowledge. At the 
same time many of the ONS documents related to subjective wellbeing quote the 
CMEPSP report as if it was advocating the inclusion of subjective wellbeing in 
national wellbeing measures. Those involved in the CMEPSP, including Amartya 
Sen, vehemently resist the inclusion of subjective wellbeing measures in national 
wellbeing measures. Indeed, the indicators which the CMEPSP identifies do not 
include subjective wellbeing measures. However, advocates of subjective wellbeing 
were members of the CMEPSP, and one of the 12 recommendations does relate to 
measuring subjective wellbeing. Some advocates of objective wellbeing argue that 
the CMEPSP report was a great milestone in the efforts to redefine and measure 
national wellbeing, but that it was a consensus document rather than one which 
has thoroughgoing coherence. Nevertheless, putting aside whether the CMEPSP’s 
recommendations are enough to justify measuring subjective wellbeing for public 
policy, it seems reasonable to ask what are the insights or potentialities of subjective 
wellbeing research that are motivating such exuberance?
There is a large and growing body of scientific literature, well over three decades, 
which shows the benefits of subjective wellbeing, narrowly or broadly conceived. 
The Foresight report on mental wellbeing and mental capital concludes that a ‘high 
level of wellbeing is associated with positive functioning, which includes creative 
thinking, productivity, good interpersonal relationships and resilience in the face 
of adversity, as well as good physical health and life expectancy’ (United Kingdom 
Government Office for Science, 2008: Section 2.2). Each of these claims is based 
on a large set of background papers that survey up-to-date scientific literature. The 
Foresight report goes on further to claim, ‘from the perspective of positive mental 
health, the aim is not simply to reduce the prevalence and severity of disorder, but 
to enable individuals to move towards flourishing, through the development and 
implementation of policies to improve mental health and wellbeing for the whole 
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population. It is important that healthy individuals, particularly children, can benefit 
from the promotion of positive mental health, as well as in clinical populations’ 
(United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2008: Section 2.2).
Whether hedonic or eudemonic wellbeing, a growing body of research shows 
that wellbeing is unequally distributed across populations, often along the socio-
economic gradient. There are some surprising relationships. For example, self-
reporting of wellbeing is highest among the young and elderly leading to research 
projects on possible causes. There is also much research literature on the possible 
relationship between income and wellbeing initially started by Richard Easterlin’s 
findings that happiness increases across countries along the GDP gradient, but within 
countries, it does not increase over time with increasing incomes (Easterlin et al, 
2010). Recently, Kahneman and Deaton found that hedonic wellbeing does not vary 
significantly across the socio-economic gradient, but life satisfaction keeps increasing 
higher up the socio-economic ladder (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010). Perhaps one 
of the most important areas of research deals with health. Researchers are examining 
the relationship between positive wellbeing, particularly positive affect and health 
(Diener et al, 1999). Levels of positive affect appear to predict mortality – is causal 
to survival – independent of baseline health status. It is unclear if positive affect is a 
marker for underlying biological, behavioural, or temperamental factors (Steptoe and 
Wardle, 2012; Steptoe and Wardle, 2011).
One of the reasons for the marked increase in subjective wellbeing research is due 
to the development of new inexpensive techniques to capture people’s momentary 
emotional states and how they spend their time on a daily basis (Kahneman et al, 
2004). Researchers were able to show that asking individuals to reconstruct the 
day before, to describe how they spent their time, for how long, and how they felt 
produces comparable data to surveys which rely on frequent real-time daily reports 
over a lengthy time period. The significance of this advance has been tempered 
somewhat by Deaton’s finding that answers to subjective wellbeing questions have 
‘question order effect’ (Deaton, 2011; Abdallah, 2011). Answers can be affected by 
a range of factors including events immediately prior to the survey, the types of 
questions asked immediately before, and significant social events. Some may use this 
finding to dismiss subjective wellbeing research. Others argue for great caution but 
expect that certain modifications can mitigate such effects. They argue that any social 
science research has the potential to suffer from a variety of distortions and biases.
As subjective wellbeing is becoming separated into multiple dimensions, researchers 
are linking responses to subjective wellbeing questions to other socio-demographic 
datasets. This is to identify possible associations with personal characteristics and 
skills, biology, situational factors, institutional factors, demographic characteristics, 
and economic, employment and environmental factors. One of the outcomes from 
the research on subjective wellbeing is the attempt to distil the research findings 
into self-help tools for individuals or good practices for corporations (Layard, 2011; 
Action for Happiness; New Economics Foundation, 2008; Hsieh, 2010).
Starting from fairly marginal beginnings, over the past four decades subjective 
wellbeing research has reached the point of becoming a recognisable area of scientific 
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inquiry at the intersection of numerous disciplines. It is still, however, nascent and 
rapidly evolving. Though much has evolved in this field over the last decade, the four 
research questions Ed Diener and colleagues identified in 1999 (Diener et al, 1999) 
are still pertinent and can be restated as:
1 Does high subjective wellbeing (among other factors) cause aspects of a good life 
such as longevity and good relationships and/or is causation the other way round?
2 How do personality, biology and external environment interact to produce high 
subjective wellbeing?
3 What is the process underlying adaptation to both good and bad conditions?
4 What are the specific inputs and points in a person’s life where an intervention 
influences and improves subjective wellbeing?
Subjective wellbeing data and public policy
So far, much of the subjective wellbeing research is based on small scale studies. 
Researchers in the United States and the UK have very recently begun incorporating 
subjective wellbeing into large panel studies. Nevertheless, some researchers and 
policy makers see enormous potential in using subjective wellbeing data in public 
policy. They see subjective wellbeing data providing alternative ways of doing cost–
benefit analysis or impact assessment; informing how to improve quality of life of 
those who experience chronic and aging related impairments; and helping inform 
decision making on such things as professions or residential moves. There is also 
much optimism that subjective wellbeing data can be combined with insights in 
behavioural economics in order to create ‘choice architecture’ that will produce 
more personal wellbeing as well as wellbeing for others. These choices could relate to 
organ donation, pension savings, health behaviours, and so forth (Parliament Office 
of Science and Technology, 2012).
Limitations and controversies
One reason that subjective wellbeing at the national level is not being measured by 
more governments is that there is disagreement as to whether it should be included 
in national wellbeing datasets. While the CMEPSP included a recommendation 
regarding subjective wellbeing measurement, it does so in very cautious language. It 
states, ‘Despite the persistence of many unresolved issues, these subjective measures 
provide important information about quality of life. Because of this, the types of 
question that have proved their value within small-scale and unofficial surveys should 
be included in larger-scale surveys undertaken by official statistical offices’ (Stiglitz 
et al, 2009). The CMEPSP strongly advocates for objective wellbeing indicators, 
but concedes that subjective wellbeing should at least be measured more widely. 
Providing such an opening for measurement, however, naturally leads to its use or 
application. Even prior to the findings from large data sets, criticisms of subjective 
wellbeing and policy applications range widely.
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In considering what the criticisms of subjective wellbeing could be, those dealing 
with methodological issues will be put aside. Dolan and colleagues discuss three 
such issues including salience, scaling and selection bias (Dolan et al, 2011), but it 
is not the methodological issues where much of the vociferous debate is occurring. 
One prevalent criticism is that governments should not try to intervene in people’s 
psychological states, particularly if it is not related to illness. Another is that subjective 
wellbeing is not an adequate indicator of good quality of life. A person can be happy 
despite being in poor health or having a low level of educational achievement. 
Moreover, people can also psychologically adapt to social conditions, so subjective 
wellbeing can be high if they lower their expectations and aspirations. It is also 
unclear whether population level wellbeing indicators change or move significantly 
over time. 
For each of these criticisms, proponents of subjective wellbeing have a response. 
Governments and other institutions continually try to influence people’s psychological 
states. Influencing the construction of preferences, whether for a toothpaste or votes, 
is a common practice. Subjective wellbeing may not be a complete indicator of 
wellbeing, but it is surely an important one. Objective wellbeing indicators focus on 
external conditions, but individuals react differently to the same external conditions 
based on their unique expectations, values and previous experiences, so it is important 
to understand the subjective. Yes, a person can be happy and have low achievements 
in other domains, but how does that devalue the experience of happiness or the 
possible beneficial consequences of positive affect? Yes, people can adapt to their 
disadvantages or social conditions, but we have very little understanding on the causal 
process. This is true of adaptation to bad conditions as well as good conditions. The 
problem of someone who is doing well objectively but has poor subjective wellbeing 
should raise questions about the end goal of objective wellbeing. No, it is not unclear 
that population level wellbeing indicators move; we can show meaningful movement 
in population mean levels of subjective wellbeing over time in different countries.
Conclusion
As I stated in the introduction, proponents of objective wellbeing express great 
ambivalence to subjective testimony in evaluating wellbeing. There are many 
justifiable reasons to have a sceptical attitude towards subjective wellbeing research 
as well as its application in policy. Perhaps, what is also at the core of resistance to 
subjective wellbeing is the uncertain role of happiness in wellbeing. Sen’s militant 
critique against utilitarianism and welfarism has been translated into ‘anti-happiness’. 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, following through on Aristotle’s philosophy of 
eudemonia, does identify some role for positive emotional experiences among 
a broad set of valuable life goods. This tension between objective and subjective 
wellbeing, and more specifically, between capabilities and happiness, has indeed been 
attempted to be resolved, but to no avail (Bruni et al, 2008).
I would argue that it is too soon to make any final judgement about subjective 
wellbeing research, how to reconcile it with objective wellbeing, and its role in 
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public policy. The field is so nascent that most of the literature speaks of potentialities 
and the need for studies of larger scale. What is worth acknowledging, however, is 
that the increased interest in subjective wellbeing has created opportunities to reflect 
much harder about some aspects of both objective and subjective wellbeing. Why 
should those who are poor and disadvantaged, whether in rich or poor countries, 
not have the opportunities to experience positive emotions and life satisfaction? 
Is the worry that if those doing badly according to objective wellbeing indicators 
improve in subjective wellbeing then they will not be motivated? Or, is it that policy 
makers will use high subjective wellbeing to justify inaction on objective wellbeing 
indicators? On the subjective wellbeing side of this debate, there is much to consider 
about whether increasing positive affect and decreasing negative affect is the totality 
of wellbeing. The argument that objective wellbeing is somehow paternalistic may 
lead to the same charge against the guidance of happiness experts down the line.
Significant questions about subjective wellbeing remain at the levels of meta-
theory, theory, research and application. The slow accretion of small bits of research 
findings over many decades has, however, reached a point of at least identifying an 
under-explored area of human wellbeing. Positive wellbeing research and subjective 
wellbeing research have also revealed some limited insights, but have received a great 
amount of attention because individuals and institutions so highly value positive 
wellbeing. Within a few decades, what began as one dimension or focus on happiness 
has multiplied into four dimensions. The criticisms against positive affect, so well 
established in the criticisms of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy, may be 
blinding individuals to the recognition of the potential of research into positive 
wellbeing, and its possible multiple dimensions. 
The profound complexities to do with subjective testimony cannot be used to 
justify excluding subjective testimony altogether. Subjective testimony is a problem 
for objective wellbeing as much as it is for subjective wellbeing. It would be a huge 
mistake to dismiss all of subjective wellbeing research by being against happiness. 
There is an important opportunity here, created by both the momentum of the 
CMEPSP report and the increasing interest in subjective wellbeing to improve 
knowledge and public deliberation about the daily quality of the lives of human 
beings within and across countries. Curiosity, rigour, caution and robust ethical 
reasoning are the order of the day. 
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